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COLLEGIALITY AND COLLABORATION
IN THE AGE OF EXCLUSIVITY
Lavrence M Sung*
INTRODUCTION
As we begin to embrace the promise of technology advancement in the
new millennium, public concern continues to grow over the potentially
stifling impact of intellectual property rights on basic scientific research
and development. In particular, the scope of U.S. patent protection has
increasingly become an target of criticism.' For example, an evolving
discontent, which has captured a great deal of news media attention in
recent days, recognizes the apparent use of patents to fence off vast
*Assistant Professor of Law, Northwestern School of Law of Lewis & Clark College.
J.D., The American University, Washington College of Law, 1993; Ph.D. (Microbiolofy),
United States Department of Defense, Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences,
1990; B.A. (Biology), University of Pennsylvania, 19S5. Former judicial clerk to the
Honorable Raymond C. Clevenger, III, The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit (Washington, D.C.). The author wishes to acknowledge the excellent re-earch
assistance of Ellen Lee Huffaker in the preparation of this Article. All inquiries andfor
comments are welcome by telephone at 503.768.6870, facsimile at 503.768.6671, or E-mail at
sung@lclark.edu.
'See, e.g., Human Genome Protest-Breaking The Genetic Code Will Test Patent Laygs,
FRE O BEE, Jan. 5, 2000, at B6 ("As university scientists pore over the findings of the Human
Genome Project, will they have to hire a patent lawyer to make sure their own work do sn't
begin to encroach on someone's intellectual property? Will the very purpose of patenting-to
justly reward pioneering research and to encourage new discoveries-help or hurt efforts to
convert the genetic information into medical treatments? At this point, there is reason for both
profound concern and excitement at the explosion in knowledge about how the human body
functions. The Patent Office should rigorously and cautiously approach every application that
seeks to comer the genetics market.... If today's patent laws begin to thwart tomorrow's
genetic discoveries, Congress has a problem that will rival the complexdty of the genome
itself.").
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW [Vol. 3:411
amounts of deoxyribonuecleic acid (DNA) sequence information being
gathered for genetic data mining efforts in the intense initial phase of
commercial bioprospecting.2 These and other anxious observations
have fueled charges that patents are hampering scientific progress by
impeding access to fundamental information or blocking the legitimate
use of basic experimental tools (or enabling technology), particularly in
academic or other non-commercial endeavors.
3
Such actions, if true, would certainly run afoul of the underlying
public policy of the U.S. patent laws. At its heart, the patent system
seeks to promote innovation by providing inventors with an
2See, e.g., Justin Gillis, Md. Gene Researcher Draws Fire on Filings: Venter Defends
Patent Requests, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 1999, at E01 (reporting criticism by academic
researchers, among others concerned over the filing in one month by Celera Genomics Corp.
(Rockville, Maryland) of 6,500 provisional patent applications to gene sequences). Despite the
assurance by Dr. J. Craig Venter, President and Chief Scientific Officer of Celera, that the
complete human genetic sequence would be made available without charge sometime during
2000, doubts regarding the benevolence of the company's research activities find support in the
twenty to thirty thousand provisional patent applications to gene sequences Celera expects to
file by the completion of its human genome project. Id. Furthermore, in the end, the greatest
commercial value involving genetic information might not lie with the actual DNA sequences,
but on the methods invented to ascribe meaning to that information. See Justin Gillis, A Gene
Dream, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 1999, at F18 (noting Celera's recognition that "[jiust because
they intend to give away raw data...doesn't mean they are giving away everything of value.").
Indeed, certain interested observers predicted early that the inevitable reliance on
bioinformatics-related software applications to analyze DNA sequence information and identify
leads for drug discovery and genetic therapy would someday create a market for efficient
database browsers. See Lawrence M. Sung & Don J. Pelto, The Biotechnology Patent
Landscape in the United States as We Enter the New Millennium, I J. WORLD INTELL. PROP.
889, 900 (1998) (comparing prospective business competition in bioinformatics software
packages to the dynamics between Netscape Communications Corp. (Mountain View,
California) and Microsoft Corp. (Redmond, Washington), involving methods of viewing
Internet materials, or between Lexise-Nexis (Dayton, Ohio) and West Group (Eagan,
Minnesota) in ways of accessing legal databases); Lawrence M. Sung & Don J. Pelto,
Bioinformatics May Get Boost From "State Street", NAT'L L.J., Oct. 19, 1998, at C28 (same).
3See Ronald Kotulak, Taking license with your genes: Patenting human genes threatens
to hamstring research and boost the price of some diagnostic tests, CHL TRIB., Sept. 12, 1999,
at CI ("The controversial practice of patenting human genes and profiting from them has begun
to impede medical research, interfere with clinical practice and raise healtheare costs, doctors
warn.") The sentiments over access expressed in this context are echoed in discussions
concerning the morality of medical procedure patents. See, e.g., Scott D. Anderson, A Right
Without a Remedy: The Unenforceable Medical Procedure Patent, 3 MAR. INTELL. PROP. L.
REv. 117 (1999); Beata Gocyk-Farber, Note, Patenting Medical Procedures. A Search for a
Compromise Between Ethics and Economics, 18 CARDOZO L. REv. 1527 (1997); Steven L.
Nichols, Hippocrates, The Patent-Holder: The Unenforceability of Medical Procedure Patents,
5 GEO. MASON L. REv. 227 (1997).
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opportunity for pecuniary reward through the government grant of
temporary exclusionary rights in their inventions.4 The inherent
emphasis on innovation is reflected in the statutory conditions for
obtaining a patent, which prescribe that inventions may be patented
only if they are useful,s new, 6 and nonobvious 7 in view of known
technology referred to as prior artY Moreover, patent grants are
predicated upon applicants' sufficient descriptions of their inventions
so that others of ordinary skill in the relevant art may recognize and
practice the claimed invention.9 Through such disclosure requirements,
4See U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (The Congress shall have power..."[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.'); 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994)
(providing that the definition of an infringer includes "whoever without authority makles, uzze,
offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the
United States any patented invention during the term of the patent"; "whoever actively induces
infringement of a patent"; and "whoever offers to sell or sells within the United State, or
imports into the United States a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination
or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented proceos, constituting
a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted
for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce
suitable for substantial noninfringing use").
5See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and uzsful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor [sic], subject to the conditions and requirements of this
6See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994) (stating in pertinent part that one may not obtain a patent if
"the invention was known or used by others in [the United States], or patented or deribed in a
printed publication [anywhere], before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or...the
invention was patented or described in a printed publication [anywvhere], more than one year
prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States...:)
7See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994 & Supp. II 1997) (In addition to the novelty or loss of right
requirements, "[a] patent may not be obtained...if the differences between the subject matter
sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a w~hole would have
been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to
which said subject matter pertains.")
sSee, e.g., OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1402 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
("It has been a basic principle of patent law, subject to minor exceptions, that prior art is:
technology already available to the public. It is available, in legal theory at least, when it is
described in the world's accessible literature, including patents, or has been publicly kmownM or
in...public use or on sale 'in this country.' That is the real meaning of 'prior art' in lqgal
theory-it is knowledge that is available, including what would be obvious from it, at a given
time, to a person of ordinary skill in the art." (citation omitted)).
9See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994) ('The specification shall contain a written dezcription of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise,
and exact terms as to enable any person sldlled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is
20001
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the patent laws essentially mandate that every patent provide a public
platform for further innovation. 
10
Given the seemingly well-balanced public policy of this legislative
scheme, upon what are the recent outcries over patent protection based?
Indeed, result-oriented observers might be quick to embrace the notion
that the United States owes its global technology leadership role in
large measure to the strength of its patent system.'1 Furthermore,
conventional wisdom suggests that the confidence in the consistent
most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention. The specification shall conclude
with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter
which the applicant regards as his invention.")
'°See, e.g., Brian P. O'Shaughnessy, The False Inventive Genus: Developing a New
Approach for Analyzing the Sufficiency of Patent Disclosure Within the Unpredictable Arts, 7
FORDHAM INTrm. PRop. MEDIA & ENr. L.J. 147, 149-50 (1996) ("The patent grant is a social
contract. Society defers for a limited time the right to make, use, or sell an invention that is
useful, novel, and nonobvious. In exchange, the applicant provides a disclosure that teaches
one of ordinary skill in the art how best to make and use that invention. As a result, society
trades a period of exclusivity for a defined contribution to its body of useful knowledge. As
more commonly stated, disclosure is the quidpro quo for the patent grant." (internal footnotes
omitted)) See State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1235-36, 224 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 418, 424 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("[K]eeping track of a competitor's products and designing
new and possibly better or cheaper functional equivalents is the stuff of which competition is
made and is supposed to benefit the consumer. One of the benefits of a patent system is its so-
called 'negative incentive' to 'design around' a competitor's products, even when they are
patented, thus bringing a steady flow of innovations to the marketplace."), cited in Craig Allen
Nard, Certainty, Fence Building, and the UsefulArts, 74 IND. L.J. 759, 791 (1999) ("As the
name 'design around' suggests, third parties, usually a competitor, may purposefully
circumvent the boundaries of the patent claim and create a competitive non-infringing
alternative to the claimed invention. The practice of designing around existing patents creates
competitive substitutes and advances, resulting in competition among patented technologies.
The public clearly benefits from such activity." (internal footnotes omitted)).
"See Richard C. Hsu & Jeffrey D. Tekanic, Keep a Strong Patent System, N.Y. TIWES,
June 7, 1998, § 3, at 14 ("An important reason for America's success in the last century is that
its patent system has prompted investment in technology, thus encouraging the world's best and
brightest engineers and scientists to come here to work. The bottom line is that a strong patent
system creates and maintains wealth, trade, investments and, ultimately, a higher standard of
living. Without a strong patent system, America could be reduced to an also-ran."); ef Francis
Gurry, Symposium On Global Competition and Public Policy In An Era of Technological
Integration: The New Global Technology Regime: The Evolution of Technology and Markets
and the Management of Intellectual Property Rights, 72 CMI.-KENT. L. REV. 369, 371 (1996)
("The new significance of intellectual capital and the increased demand for intellectual property
are both occurring within the context of the globalization of markets. In this process of
globalization, intellectual capital has been a vector of internationalization and intellectual
property has been an instrument of competitive positioning in global markets").
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enforcement of patent rights likely acts as the catalyst for capital
investment and industrial growth.
12
Arguably, the furor stems from growing uncertainty along at least
two fronts. First, the perception exists that the otherwise generic patent
laws cannot satisfactorily govern new technologies through the
application of traditional legal doctrines. 13  Second, unpredictable
business dynamics apparently have evolved as a consequence of a
seemingly irrational demand for the imprimatur of patent registration
without regard to the true scope of protection.14 Ongoing scholarly and
12See Simone A. Rose, Patent "Monopolyphobia": A Means of Extinguishing tho
Fountainhead?, 49 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 509, 550 (1999) ("[A]fter the formation of the
Federal Circuit the number of patent applications filed increased dramatically. Patentes
appeared to believe that this Circuit possessed the technical expertise to evaluate patentability
during the prosecution stage and would consistently and equitably evaluate appeals from the
Patent Office. Interestingly, the minor recession suffered in the 1980s had little impact on the
number of applications filed. This may suggest that public sentiment about patents andfor the
prosecution process more significantly impacts changes in applications filed, rather than
economics, unless there is a severe economic shift").
"See Peter Weissman, Computer Software As Patentable Subject Matter: Contrasting
United States, Japanese, and European Lairs, 23 AM. INma. PROP. L. ASs'N QJ. 525, 527
(1995) ("The statutory language used to define patentable subject matter in the United States
has not changed significantly since it was first developed over 200 years ago. Consequently,
once technology expands into formerly unimaginable domain, intellectual property laws must
similarly adjust in order to either provide or preempt protection. However, where law-making
bodies do not act, courts and administrative agencies, such as the Patent and Trademark Office,
are left with the difficult task of applying antiquated laws to new technologies. Often, this
procedure is analogous to fitting a square peg into a round hole. One area in which courts have
been faced with unforeseen scientific advances is in the field of computer-related inventions");
see also Peter Drahos, Biotechnology Patents, Markets and Morality, 9 Eum. ItM L Prop.
REv. 441,443 (1999) ("A crucial aspect to the expansion of the patenting in biotechnology has
been the development of juridical arguments and theories that have enabled applicants for
biotech patents to overcome existing bars. One of the interesting things is that, vhile these
arguments are often analytically weak, they have been readily accepted by the patent
community in the name of adapting the patent system to changing circumstances of technolo y
and innovation").
14See Robin Marantz Henig, The Rush to Claim a Little Slice ofLife, WASH. PosT, Jan. 9,
2000, at B05 ("Never before has our 210-year-old patent law been contorted in quite this way,
protecting discoveries instead of inventions, biological information instead of machines. At the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, more than 10,000 provisional patent applications for various
segments of the human genome are awaiting action. The applications come from Celera and its
two main for-profit competitors, Human Genome Sciences Inc. (vhich, like Celera, has its
headquarters in Rockville) and Incyte Pharmaceuticals Inc., based in Palo Alto, Calif In all but
a handful of cases, no one at these companies yet understands the function, usefulness or
commercial value of the genetic material for which patent applications have been made. The
applications serve simply as place holders").
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other public debates over the effect of patent protection on computer
software and biotechnology innovation help inform such perspectives.'
5
This article takes a somewhat different approach in addressing the
innovation issue, and instead considers the impact of the laws
governing intellectual property rights in the United States on the
collegiality and collaboration of researchers. The first section of this
article introduces the criticality of these relational aspects to the
dynamics of scientific progress. Next the article reviews and assesses
the patent law jurisprudence on invention, and more particularly, that
regarding joint invention. The article continues with a discussion of
how the legal standards of inventorship under the patent laws might
affect the research and development conducted at various public and
private institutions, academic or otherwise. Of the many technologies
possibly implicated in similar fashion, the medical and pharmaceutical
arts will form the primary context for the discussion in this article. 16
15See Teresa Riordan, The Government Will Take A Second Look At A Patent It Issued
For A Year 2000 Software Program, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 27, 1999, at C5 (quoting U.S. Senator
Charles Schumer (D-NY) on the subject of soffvare patents as "one of the most vexing issues
facing Congress this year and in the next few years. As a country, we value intellectual
property rights. But the recent expansion of what is patentable could have a detrimental effect
on the technological expansion of our economy."); Denise Caruso, Concern Is Growing Over
People And Companies That Are Stockpiling Patents To Be Used As Competitive Weapons,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1999, at C4 ("Ideas are given their literal currency through patent and
copyright laws, originally intended to stimulate innovation by protecting inventors from idea
snatchers and allowing them to profit more easily from their talents. But some experts worry
that an increasing number of individuals and companies are perverting that original purpose
with increasingly specious claims to ownership, as well as by stockpiling patents into
competitive arsenals"); see generally Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents
Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698 (May 1, 1998).
Intellectual property issues have also come to the fore in the context of global commerce. See
Jennifer Bjorhus, Putting a Price on Intellectual Property, OREGONIAN, Nov. 14, 1999, at El
("Intellectual property is one of three broad subjects on the agenda for the World Trade
Organization's meeting Nov. 30 to Dec. 3 in Seattle. The topic creates one of the deepest fault
lines between the agency's industrialized and developing member nations").
16See generally Harold C. Wegner, PATENT LAW IN BIOTECHNOLOGY CHEMICALS &
PIIAMACEAcucALs (2d ed. 1994) (providing a detailed and comprehensive consideration of the
application of the patent law to specific fields of technology).
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BACKGROUND
Science As a Collective Endeavor
While some might characterize all innovation as collaborative, 17 the
mark of true collaboration should be the act of information exchange,
irrespective of the relative contribution of the actors. For example, a
lone scientist relying upon the teachings of published literature depends
no less on the benefits of another's information than a team scientist
that works as part of a research and development group.' 8 However,
only in the latter scenario does the sharing of knowledge appear to take
place. In any event, this article will focus on those relationships where
a presumptive multilateral benefit accrues to all participants.
Few, if any, generalizations seem appropriate regarding the
relative merits of individual versus team effort toward advancing the
state of the art' 9 Success stories in both regards are sufficiently replete
throughout scientific history to set aside the significance of the
17see Robert Merton, ON THE SHOULDERS OF Gumrs: A SHADEAN POSTSCRiPT 31 n.3
(1965) ("If I have seen further it is by standing on ye sholders of Giants." (quoting Letter from
Sir Isaac Newton to Robert Hooke (Feb. 5, 1675 or 1676))).
18See Edward F. Sherry & David L Teece, Some Economic Aspects Of Intellectual
Property Damages, 573 PRAC. L. INSTJPAT. 399 (1999) ("The paradigm of thought seems to be
the 'better mousetrap,' where a lone inventor, drawing on material which is unquestionably in
the public domain, develops a new design which can be built by nearly anyone, using existing
unpatented technology. In such a context, the patent in question is a key enabling patent which
is roughly coextensive with the economic value-added of the new product (and any infringing
products). Nowadays the old paradigm cases tend to be relatively rare. Most commercially
valuable innovations are due to the contributions of a number of factors. Most technical
progress is incremental in nature. Every innovation 'stands on the shoulders of' earlier
innovations, and often makes extensive use of complementary assets and complementary
technology."); Mark A. Lemley, The Economies of Improvement in Intellcetual Propcrty Lm;,
75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1010 (1997) ("In some sense, any invention, no matter how pioneering,
can be thought of as an improvement on prior work.").
19See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Evclusive Rights and
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHL L. REV. 1017, 1066 (1989) ('IThe prospect theory [in favor of
coordination of research initiatives by patent holders] is primarily concerned with promoting
efficiency in research, while the argument for individualism and independence takes the
promotion of scientific progress to be an unqualified goal. Thus it might be argued that even if
greater scientific progress could be achieved through independent research initiatives in a
system of free access to prior discoveries than through coordinated research cfforts in a system
of exclusive rights, the additional progress to be expected in the former type of system would
not justify its greater costs in wasteful duplication of research effort.").
2000]
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comparison. Still, the continuing establishment and maintenance of
dedicated research and development centers appears to reflect a
conventional wisdom that recognizes the present value of facilitating
collaboration. 2
1
20When asked to identify the greatest inventors in history, most tend to recall individuals.
See, e.g., Heroes & Villains; Those Who Shaped The World's History, For Better Or Worse,
N.Y. POST, Jan. 1, 2000, at 12 (listing Thomas Edison, Alexander Graham Bell, Henry Ford,
and Wilbur and Orville Wright, among others). However, the focus on such icons belies the
reality that an overwhelming majority of inventions result from team effort. See Douglas
Baldwin, The Patent and Technology License, 576 PRAc. L. INST./PAT. 629, 632 (1999) ("In
the past, most commercially important technology was developed by individuals, or by
corporate research. It was substantially developed by a single entity [with as little outside input
or content as necessary]. Today, that is no longer true. Today, most commercially important
technology is an amalgam of inputs from several sources, as, for example academic or
government research, with commercial company development, collaboration by two or more
companies or by merger. Commercial development may be completed by an established
company or by a new company set up specifically to exploit the technology-often with
venture capitalist involvement.").21See W. Fritz Fasse, The Muddy Metaphysics of Joint Inventorship: Cleaning Up Afler
the 1984 Amendments to 35 U.S.C. § 116, 5 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 153, 159-60 (1992) ("Total
innovation is usually increased by the sharing of knowledge and ideas among members of a
research team. Thus, to achieve the goal of maximum innovation, the patent system should
foster actual collaboration among researchers. This collaboration will lead to more joint
inventive work and the development of more patentable inventions." (internal footnotes
omitted)). To promote research and development interactions between federal laboratories and
industry, the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-502, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess., 100 Stat. 1785 (1986) (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701 et seq.), was enacted to increase the
exchange of knowledge and personnel on collaborative projects through Cooperative Research
and Development Agreements (CRADAs). See Thomas N. Bulleit, Jr., Public-Private
Partnerships in Biomedical Research: Resolving Conflicts of Interest Arising Under the
Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, 4 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 8 (1990) ("Under a typical NIH
CRADA, a government scientist collaborates on a specified research project with a company
scientist (the 'investigators'). The company might also fund one or more research fellows to
work with the government's principal investigator on the research project. The company may
also contribute other resources, such as additional research scientists, supplies or operating
expenses. In exchange for this support and participation, the company obtains rights-typically
an exclusive license or an option to an exclusive license-in any invention produced under the
collaboration."). Similar considerations have been raised regarding international technology
collaborations. See Stacey M. Berg et al., Panel Hearing on Foreign Research Alliances, 5 J.
PROPRmTARY RTS. 35, 35 (1993) ("At a panel hearing before the Science Subcommittee of the
House Committee on Science, Space and Technology on October 28, 1993, proponents of
scientific research alliances between foreign corporations and U.S. universities testified that
such alliances are crucial to prepare students to compete in a global economy. Susan Wray,
Director of Patent, Copyright and Technology Licensing for the University of Florida,
attributed the superiority of the U.S. university system to the universities' abilities to utilize
foreign research expertise. Wray emphasized the importance of fostering 'international'
collaboration and exchange of ideas").
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The paradigm that two minds are better than one traditionally has
rested on the additive concept of background experience, not just
cognitive synergy.22 However, reliance upon another person as an
information source is increasingly unnecessary in an age where
telecommunications and other information technology affords all of us
an unprecedented individual portal to the world's accumulated
knowledge. If such a benefit grows anachronistically, what incentive to
collaborate will likely survive and predominate?
To be sure, the social aspects of collaboration play no small role.
The rewards of interaction do not culminate with the successful
completion of an innovative endeavor.24 In a recent consideration of
possible motivations underlying the human resources engaged in
scientific research and development, an economics scholar observed:
Science is a collective endeavor: an industry in which the
work of one set of specialists serves as the input for other
lines of specialized production. From a collective point of
view, science can only function rationally by an efficient
division of labor. If the available talents and efforts are
allocated suboptimally, scientific production will not achieve
collective excellence even if it is optimized from the
viewpoint of the individual.2
22Cf. Laurence R. Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Thcory of Etctis
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 325 (1997) (analyzing the deference given by
various national courts to the decisions of the European Court of Justice and the Europ-'an
Court of Human Rights and commenting that "[t]he underlying premise here assumes the
intrinsic value of widespread and diverse input in a deliberative process: Two minds are batter
than one, and fifteen minds, particularly minds from different perspectives and culture, are
better than two").
23See generally Donald S. Chisum et aL, Pnnwcwl/.s OF PA=ENT LAW 34-50 (1997)
(discussing various theories of property rights and their implications on the patent laws); sfc
also id at 44 n.4 (citing Leo Katz, ILL-GoTTEN GAINs: EVAsI0, BLACImAIL, ArD K1lnD.ED
PUZZLES OF THE LAW (1996) for its consideration of fame and glory and the societal rules, if
any, that govern these aspects).24See Jon Cohen, The Culture of Credit, 268 SCi. 1706, 1706 (1995) (CIn science, as in so
many other professions, the coin of the realm is not collaborative generosity but credit-credit
for individuals.... With credit from one's peers comes access to all important grant funding,
easier publication in leading journals, and a steady supply of the grad students and posdocs
who make the lab inn").
2George Franck, Scientific Communication - A Vanity Fair?, 2S6 SCL 53, 53 (1999).
Professor Franck proposes that "attention," i.e., the recognition achieved as a bypreduct of
scientific accomplishment, forms the currency for interaction among researchers. Id The
2000]
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In considering scientific progress through the metric of inventive
acts, another scholar has echoed these sentiments:
We all recite the myth of the lonely intellectual. Yet,
creativity, with all its need for retreat and isolation, is not a
lonely act after all. If great inventors like Edison or Bell had
one overriding form of genius, it was a genius for forming
communities of open and inventive collaborators around
themselves. These scholars, too, treasured community.26
Accordingly, to the extent that collaboration constitutes an integral
force in the progress in the scientific and engineering arts, the success
of this interaction depends upon the nature of collegiality that exists.27
In turn, the degree of such collegiality rests upon the ability of
members of these communities to agree and adhere to recognizable
standards of conduct that promote collaborative behavior.28  In this
regard, the U.S. patent laws are implicated, at least in part.29
health of scientific progress, according to Professor Franek, depends upon the ability of
members of the scientific community to strike the appropriate balance between the investment
and return of individual attention. See id. at 55.26John Lienhard, Reflections on Information, Biology, and Community, 32 Hous. L. REV.
303, 309 (1995).
27See Cohen, supra note 24, at 1706 ("Scientific ideals call for collaboration and sharing.
But in today's competitive scientific enterprise, a tremendous premium is placed on individual
credit, setting the stage for conflict").
2'See id. ("[A]II researchers know, whether they've been taught in a class or simply
assimilated the relevant principles from those around them, that a scientist is supposed to
respect the collaborative nature of the process: Credit is to be shared appropriately; the findings
of others-even from competing labs-are to be cited; students are to be treated generously;
materials and data are to be shared freely. Somewhere, somehow, every scientist learns those
largely unwritten rules").
29For an excellent scholarly consideration of the relative merits of intellectual property
protection of biotechnology by trade secrets as opposed to patents, see Dan L. Burk,
Misappropriation of Trade Secrets in Biotechnology Licensing, 4 ALB. L.J. SCi. & TEcH. 121,
141-42 (1994) ("Although trade secrecy may be the required or desired form of intellectual
property protection, the characteristics of the biotechnology industry reviewed above pose
certain problems for this type of protection. First, the prevalence of strategic alliances in this
industry means that a great many trade secrets will be licensed to partner firms, and a high
frequency of agreements alone will increase the likelihood of trade secrets disputes. More
importantly, however, these secrets will change hands in a young industry that has little
experience or case lav to guide it in fashioning or interpreting such agreements.... The
academic roots of the biotechnology industry may also pose special problems. The
professional norms of the scientific community have long required that scientists share data and
[Vol. 3:411
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The significance of inventorship to the patent system is an issue
upon which there is a dearth of debate. The vestments that the title of
inventor bestows include the recognition of ingenuity manifested
through social contribution, and the warrant of ownership in definable
intellectual property. Whereas the first aspect can elevate the peer
status and collaborative capital characterized as scientific attention, the
second highlights a potential gain generally measured in harder
currency. 30  Unlike mere attribution, therefore, the inventorship
designation embodies a pecuniary benefit, the magnitude of which
tends toward direct proportionality with the likelihood of controversy.
31
Many scientists could argue that until very recently, the attention
achieved through publication attribution sufficed to foster collegiality,
and thus, collaboration within their circles.32 In the same breath, such
materials with one another, both to allow repetition and validation of reported r-sults and to
facilitate new discoveries. Indeed, many peer review journals require the authors of papers
published in those journals to make their biological materials freely available. University
researchers have routinely supplied other researchers with requested materials and have
expected to have their own materials requests freely fulfilled in return. Such free exchange of
materials and data is generally incompatible with the requirements of trade secrecy. This may
make trade secrecy difficult in research ventures involving universities. And as former
academic researchers enter commercial firms, their continued desire to publish and exchange
research results with colleagues may compromise the trade secret position of their new
employer").
30Compare Franck, supra note 25, at 55 ("Publication establishes intellectual property.
Published information may thus not be used as a means of production without the user's
acquiring a license to do so. The license for using somebody else's information productively is
obtained through transfer of some of the attention earned by the citing author to the cited
author. Citation thus reflects the preparedness to pay on the part of those using information
productively, by crediting to somebody else the productive impact of the cited information on
one's own work."), with Sandip H. Patel, Note, Graduate Students' Ownership andAttribution
Rights in Intellectual Property, 71 IND. L.L 481,484 n.7 (1995) (reporting various examples of
multimillion dollar royalty fees obtained by universities from patent licenses with private
corporations to technology invented by university researchers).
31See Jackie Hutter, Note, A Definite and Permanent Idea? Invention in the
Pharmaceutical and Chemical Sciences and the Determination of Conception in Patent Lav,
28 J. MlA Asi . L. REV. 687, 725 (1995) ("Moreover, increased emphasis on collaborative
efforts directed toward the commercial development of novel, but not yet applied, technology
will likely result in a greater number of cases in which researchers contest inventor-hip. That
is, the parties participating in joint research may claim ownership of the invention separately
and in conflict with one another").
32See Eisenberg, supra note 19, at 1046-48 ("The idea of enforcing exclusive rights
against researchers fundamentally conflicts with traditional scientific norms calling for free
dedication of new knowledge to the scientific community.... At a functional level, the
contradiction between scientific communism/communality and the grant of exclusive rights in
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voices might also lament that the face of basic research and
development has changed due to the expansion of intellectual property
rights, particularly through assertive patent enforcement in a seemingly
unprecedented manner.33 The U.S. patent laws, which are designed to
promote innovation, should facilitate and not hinder the vehicles for
progress, such as collegiality and collaboration.34 With these principles
in mind, the question of the impact of patent protection on collaborative
behavior warrants a closer scrutiny of the law governing inventorship.
Conception As the Touchstone of Invention
Whether express or implied in its distinct statutory provisions, U.S.
patent law begins with an act of invention, and perhaps equally
important, the designation of an inventor.35  The procurement of a
patent right cannot proceed absent at least one inventor.36  The legal
new discoveries under the patent system reflects divergent perspectives on how best to promote
scientific progress. The patent laws rest on the premise that granting exclusive rights in
discoveries will promote progress; the normative authority of scientific communism/
communality derives at least in part from the assumption that this same goal will be better
served by granting free access to such discoveries." (internal footnotes omitted)).33See Patel, supra note 30, at 484-85 ("Today, our nation's universities provide essential
and cutting-edge technological innovation that once could be found only in industry or
government laboratories. The growth of the university as the birthplace of many inventive
discoveries over the past two decades has brought recognition, prestige, and money to these
schools. Universities consequently approach today's advances with the hope of educational
and monetary achievement inconceivable twenty-five years ago. One need look no further than
the comprehensive university intellectual property guidelines to see that administrators
recognize the prizes that are now customary with major advances. The growing university
practice of producing and selling technological advances is a benefit to university budgets, yet
does not come without special problems." (internal footnotes omitted)).34See Fasse, supra note 21, at 207 ("Because a mutual exchange of ideas and information
among inventors results in increased aggregate innovation, a collaboration requirement of this
nature serves to further a fundamental policy goal of the patent laws. To foster collaboration,
the law must require and reward inventive work that is in fact the product ofjoint efforts").35See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title").
368ee 35 U.S.C. § 111 (1994) ("An application for patent shall be made, or authorized to
be made, by the inventor, except as otherwise provided in this title, in writing to the
Commissioner."); see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 117-118 (1994) (providing for application by persons




significance of the inventor and the propriety of his or her claim to such
a status cannot be overstated.37
The jurisprudence of inventorship rests upon the tenet that
conception is the touchstone of invention.38 Indeed, from the earliest
cases, courts have uniformly held that an inventor is a person who
conceived the patented invention.3 9 However, the relatively static
nature of the patent law principles underlying inventorship belies the
long-standing discontent with their practical application.40
The legal standard of conception can be considered the "formation
in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and permanent idea of the
37The ultimate penalty of patent invalidation may be imposed puruant to 35 U.S.C.
§ 256 (1994) for the intentional failure to designate a true inventor of the patented subject
matter. For unintentional omission of a true inventor, or for originally designating a prson
who is later determined not to be a true inventor, the patent may simply be corrected to reflect
the appropriate inventor identification. See id By comparison, with respect to correction of
inventorship during prosecution of the patent application, 35 U.S.C. § 116 requires the lack of
deceptive intent in both misjoinder and nonjoinder. See Stark v. Advanced Ma2netics, Inc.,
119 F.3d 1551, 1555,43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (noting the difference
between the two statutory provisions governing correction of inventorship). In any event, the
Federal Circuit also has addressed the proper procedural asects for the correction of
inventorship. See Pannu v. Iolab Corp., 155 F.3d 1344, 1350, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1657,
1662 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("When a party asserts invalidity under [35 U.S.C.] § 162{1) due to
nonjoinder, a district court should first determine whether there exists clear and convincing
evidence that the alleged unnamed inventor was in fact a co-inventor.... [Tihe patentee, must
then be given an opportunity to correct inventorship pursuant to [35 U.S.C. § 2561.... Fin-ally,
a patent with improper inventorship does not avoid invalidation simply becauze it might b.e
corrected under section 256. Rather, the patentee must claim entitlement to relief under the
statute...").
38See Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1227-20, 32
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1915, 1919 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Sewall v. Walters, 21 F.3d 411, 415, 30
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1356, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1994).39See Collar Co. v. Van Dusen, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 530, 563-64 (1C74). Indeed, one need
not personally reduce to practice his or her complete conception to remain an inventor. Acts by
others in certain circumstances can inure to the inventor's benefit. Sce Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154
F.3d 1321, 1332, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1896, 1905 (Fed. Cir. 19903) ("In order to cstablinh
inurement, an inventor must show, among other things, that the other persn was working
either explicitly or implicitly at the inventor's request. While derivation focu:e on the
communication of information between two parties, inurement focuses on the nature of the
relationship between them. Communication of the conception by the inventor to the other prty
is not required to establish inurement." (internal citations omitted)).40See, eg., Mueller Brass Co. v. Reading Indus., Inc., 352 F. Supp. 1357, 1372-73 (E.D.
Pa. 1972) (The exact parameters of what constitutes joint inventorship are quite difficult to
define. It is one of the muddiest concepts in the muddy metaphysics of the patent law.."),
a.ff'dmem., 487 F.2d 1395 (3d Cir. 1973).
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complete and operative invention."A1 The courts have further explained
that an idea is sufficiently "definite and permanent" when "only
ordinary skill would be necessary to reduce the invention to practice,"
without extensive research or experimentation.42  Of the positive
indicia of inventorship, the ability to articulate the inventive concept is
an important starting point.
[T]he test for conception is whether the inventor had an idea
that was definite and permanent enough that one skilled in the
art could understand the invention; the inventor must prove
his conception by corroborating evidence, preferably by
showing a contemporaneous disclosure. An idea is definite
and permanent when the inventor has a specific, settled idea,
a particular solution to the problem at hand, not just a general
goal or research plan he hopes to pursue. The conception
analysis necessarily turns on the inventor's ability to describe
his invention with particularity. Until he can do so, he cannot
prove possession of the complete mental picture of the
invention. These rules ensure that patent rights attach only
when an idea is so far developed that the inventor can point to
a definite, particular invention.4
3
Common misconceptions abound with respect to the relationship
between inventorship and ownership. 4 Whereas inventorship rests
with the inventive act alone, ownership depends upon the public and
private contractual rights and obligations of the inventor.45
41See Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376, 231 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 81, 87 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (quoting 1 RoBINSON ON PATENTS 532 (1890)).
42See id, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 87.43See Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1228, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1915, 1919 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).
44See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Inventors of the World, Unite! A Call for Collective Action by
Employee-Inventors, 37 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 673, 680 (1997) ("The generally unstated
assumption that institutions such as corporations or universities are the 'real' inventors is
evidenced by the fact that the two are often used interchangeably by intellectual property law
practitioners, and even sometimes scholars, despite the fact that by statute only living breathing
people can be named in patents as inventors. Even those who happen to notice the difference
between employee-inventors and inventor employees don't seem particularly troubled by the




Inventorship is a title conferred irrespective of the inventor's
subsequent ownership rights! 6 Where inventorship and ownership do
not coincide, an inventor might receive no pecuniary benefit from the
invention.47 The assignment of patent rights subject to an employment
contract typifies such circumstances.
48
The inventor is the presumptive owner of any patent rights to the
invention.49 All inquiries regarding patent ownership thus begin with
inventorship.50 Absent an implied or express assignment of the patent
rights, the inventor remains the holder of title to these rights.5 ' Given
46See Beech Aircraft Corp. v. EDO Corp., 990 F.2d 1237, 1248, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1572, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("It is elementary that inventorship and ownership are separate
issues. An application for a patent must be made by or on behalf of the actual inventor or
inventors of the subject matter claimed therein. Thus, inventorship is a question of who
actually invented the subject matter claimed in a patent. O ner-ship, however, is a question of
who owns legal title to the subject matter claimed in a patent, patents having the attributes of
personal property. At the heart of any ownership analysis lies the question of who first
invented the subject matter at issue, because the patent right initially vests in the inventor who
may then, barring any restrictions to the contrary, transfer that right to another, and so forth.
However, who ultimately possesses ownership rights in that subject matter has no bearing
whatsoever on the question of who actually invented that subject matter").
47See Patel, supra note 30, at 499 n.99 ("This could raise ethical issues between a
professor and the university. The professor motivated by altruistic rather than economic beliefs
could undermine the university's interest in the profits accompanying commercial exploitation
of the invention by dedicating the invention to the public through publication.... An attempt by
the university to limit the professor's ability to disclose the invention in this manner through
contractual agreements may cast doubts on the university's goals of promoting academic
freedom, generating information, and freely disseminating that infbrmation.").43See Richard C. Witte & Eric W. Guttag, Employee Imentions, 71 J. PAT. &
TRDEMAIxK OFF. Soc'y 467, 479 (1989) (reporting that roughly 80% of the patents granted
during the period 1975-1984 issued to a corporate assignee); sce also Bartow, supra note 44, at
682-94 (providing a scholarly critique of corporate pre-invention assignment agreements
which the author characterizes persuasively as a"misdirection of incentives to innovate").
49See 37 C.F.R. § 3.81(a) (1999) (authorizing the issuance of a patent in the name of the
assignee only if the inventor records an assignment of the entire right, title, and interest before
payment of the issue fee); see also 35 U.S.C. § 152 (1994) ("Patents may be granted to the
assignee of the inventor of record in the Patent and Trademark Office, upon the application
made and the specification sworn to by the inventor, except as otherwise provided in this
title").
S0See University Patents, Inc. v. Kligman, 762 F. Supp. 1212, 1218-19, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1401, 1405 (E.D. Pa. 1991) ("Although 'ownership' and 'inventorhip' are not identical
for patent law purposes, they are related. Inventorship provides the starting point for
determining ownership of patent rights. The true and original inventor must be named in the
application for a patent and, absent some effective transfer or obligation to assign the patent
rights, the original inventor owns the right to obtain the patent").
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the standard provisions in most employment contracts these days for
the assignment of intellectual property rights from the author or
inventor to the employer, ownership disputes between the inventor and
his or her employer are relatively rare.5
2
Instead, controversies involving issues of patent ownership, and
thus inventorship, more often arise between the assignees of the patent
rights, where questions exist regarding joint invention between their
respective employees. 53  Because joint inventorship can be a natural
consequence of collaborative efforts, institutions might tend to
discourage such behavior in favor of creating exclusive ownership of
any patent rights, at the expense of overall scientific progress. S4
Indeed, the significance of joint invention on patent rights is reflected
in the ample jurisprudence and scholarship that has developed
concerning this specific aspect of inventorship.
5
'See also Patel, supra note 30, at 493 ("Absent a preinvention assignment agreement or
any other evidence that the employee was hired to invent, an employer whose employer uses
the employer's resources to conceive, or reduce to practice, an invention acquires a 'shop
right.'... The shop right gives the employer a nonexclusive, royalty-free, nontransferable
license to make, use, and sell the invention. The doctrine does not provide the employer with
an ownership interest since the employee, as the patentee, retains all other rights, including
licensing and filing of infringement suits. The shop right continues for the life of the patent
even if the employee-inventor leaves the place of employment." (internal footnotes omitted)),
52See id at 493-94 ("[I]n an effort to ensure ownership rights in their employees'
inventions, most employers draft preinvention assignment agreements. These agreements are
standard form contracts in which an employee agrees to assign rights in all inventions made
during the term of employment to his or her employer in exchange for a salary and continued
employment. The agreements substitute private contractual terms for the disclosure-protection
balance struck in patent law .... Today, however, courts agree that an employee and employer
may enter into a binding agreement where the employee agrees to assign interests in future
inventions to the employer.").
53See, e.g., University of Colorado Found., Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 196 F.3d
1366, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (patent infringement suit); C.R. Bard, Inc. v.
M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (same); Cooper v.
Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1896 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (interference
proceeding).
54See Fasse, supra note 21, at 157 ("An even starker conflict of interest occurs when
inventors employed by different companies collaborate on a joint research project. Each
inventor has an incentive to be recognized for his contribution. Each employer, however, has




By statute, a patent may issue to multiple inventors.55 Since the
1984 amendment to 35 U.S.C. § 116, a patent application may be filed
by persons jointly even if
(1) they did not physically work together or at the same time,
(2) each did not make the same type or amount of
contribution, or
(3) did not make a contribution to the subject matter of every
claim of the patent.
5 6
By virtue of joint inventorship, each owner of the corresponding
patent rights (the co-inventor or assignee) is entitled to full enjoyment
of those rights.57 For example, where Company X (to which co-
S5See 35 U.S.C. § 116 (1994).55See ic ("When an invention is made by two or more persons jointly, they shall apply
for patent jointly and each make the required oath, except as othervie provided in this title.
Inventors may apply for a patent jointly even though (1) they did not physically work together
or at the same time, (2) each did not make the same type or amount of contribution, or (3) did
not make a contribution to the subject matter of every claim of the patent7). The present
version of this statutory provision reflects legislative action in 1984 to broaden the eligibility
for joint inventorship to include any person who makes an inventive contribution to at least one
claim of the patent. See Patent Law Amendments of 1934, Pub. L. No. 9S-622, § 104(a), 93
Stat. 3383, 3383-84 (1984) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 116 (1994)). The desire to facilitate patent
protection for inventions developed by corporate and academic research teams formed the
legislative intent behind the 1984 amendment. See President's Statement on Signing H.R. 6263
into Law, 20 WEEKLY CoMip. PREs. Doc. ISIS (Nov. 9, 1984). Prior to 19S4,35 U.S.C. § 116
provided in pertinent part that "[w]hen an invention is made by two or more persons jointly,
they shall apply for patent jointly and each sign the application and make the required oath,
except as otherwise provided in this title." In concert, Congress amended 35 U.S.C. § 103 to
remove any disincentive to information sharing and collaboration among team rczearchers due
to the untoward effect under the existing law that one team member's unpublished work might
be prior art against, and thus preclude the patenting of, another team member's worr. Sce
Statements of G. Mossinghoff & H. Manbeck, Jr., Innovation and Patent Law Reform:
Hearings on H.R 3285, HR.? 3286 and H.R. 3605 Before the Subcommittee on Coaurts, Civil
Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. On the Judiciary, 9Sth Cong.,
2d Sess. 26-27, 61-62, 71-72 (1984).
5See 35 U.S.C. § 262 (1994 & Supp. m 1997) ('In the absence of any agreement to the
contrary, each of the joint owners of a patent may make, use, [offer to sell,] or sell the patented
invention [within the United States, or import the patented invention into the United Stat]
without the consent of and without accounting to the other owners."); sce also Eric K. Steffe at
al., Biotech Collaborations and Maximizing Patent Protection: Two Hypotlheticals, 27 AM.
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inventor A has assigned her rights) licenses the patented technology to
Company Z, Company Y (to which co-inventor B has assigned his
rights) has no recourse against Company Z for its otherwise infringing
activities. Accordingly, the intertwining of business fates resulting
from joint invention, and thus co-ownership, can facilitate somewhat
intricate, and perhaps frustrating, market dynamics.
58
Scientific Collaboration
and the Problem of Joint Inventorship
Like inventorship generally, the issue of joint inventorship has proven
somewhat problematic for courts to articulate cogent standards, which
are easily applicable to determine whether a person is a co-inventor.
Although the Federal Circuit has considered numerous cases possibly
implicating joint inventorship, the court set forth its clearest guidance
in Fina Oil & Chemical Co. v. Ewen.59 The Federal Circuit stated:
[35 U.S.C. § 116] sets no explicit lower limit on the quantum
or quality of inventive contribution required for a person to
qualify as a joint inventor. Rather, a joint invention is simply
the product of a collaboration between two or more persons
working together to solve the problem addressed. The
determination of whether a person is a joint inventor is fact
specific, and no bright-line standard will suffice in every
case.
Nonetheless, our precedent provides guidance as to what
types of acts are, or are not, sufficient in quantum and quality
to establish joint inventorship. One need not conceive of the
INTLL. PROP. L. Ass'N Q.J. 149, 181 (1999) (considering various private contractual
arrangements available to allocate ownership among joint inventors and/or their assignees).58See Schering Corp. v. Roussel-UCLAF SA, 104 F.3d 341, 344, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1359, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("Each co-owner of a United States patent is ordinarily free to
make, use, offer to sell, and sell the patented invention without regard to the wishes of any
other co-owner. Each co-owner's ownership rights carry with them the right to license others,
a right that also does not require the consent of any other co-owner. Thus, unless the co-owner
has given up these rights through an 'agreement to the contrary,' the co-owner may not be
prohibited from exploiting its rights in the patent, including the right to grant licenses to third
parties on whatever conditions the co-owner chooses." (internal citations omitted)).




entire invention alone, for this would obviate the concept of
joint inventorship. However, ajoint inventor must contribute
in some significant manner to the conception of the invention.
As such, "each inventor must contribute to the joint arrival at
a definite and permanent idea of the invention as it will be
used in practice."60
If a person supplies the required quantum of inventive
contribution, that person does not lose his or her status as a
joint inventor just because he or she used the services, ideas,
and aid of others in the process of perfecting the invention.
However, those others may also in appropriate circumstances
become joint inventors by their contributions. In addition, a
person is not precluded from being a joint inventor simply
because his or her contribution to a collaborative effort is
experimental.
The basic exercise of the normal skill expected of one skilled
in the art, without an inventive act, also does not make one a
joint inventor. Therefore, a person will not be a co-inventor
if he or she does no more than explain to the real inventors
concepts that are well known and the current state of the art.
The case law thus indicates that to be a joint inventor, an
individual must make a contribution to the conception of the
claimed invention that is not insignificant in quality, when
that contribution is measured against the dimension of the full
invention.
61
In Fina, the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the district
court's summary judgment that Dr. Abbas Razavi was the only true
inventor of U.S. Patent No. 4,892,851, despite the fact that Dr. John A.
Ewen had been listed on the patent as a co-inventor.62 The Federal
Circuit held that the district court had erred by failing to consider
'See Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1229,32 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1915, 1919 (Fed. Cir. 1994).61 d, at 1473,43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941.
62See I at 1468, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1936 (reporting the district court's ruling that
Dr. Razavi was the sole inventor of the '851 patent). The patented technology related to a
metallocene catalyst used to produce syndiotactic polypropylene (SPP) and methods for
making the catalyst. See id, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1937.
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whether Dr. Ewen "did not at least contribute in some significant way
to the ultimate conception" of the invention.63 Moreover, the Federal
Circuit reiterated that Dr. Razavi had not met his burden of proving by
clear and convincing evidence that Dr. Ewen "made no contribution to
the conception of the invention claimed in the '851 patent or a
contribution that was qualitatively insignificant."
64
Beyond setting forth the amount and character of contribution
necessary among involved researchers to establish joint inventorship,
the Federal Circuit in Fina recognized that joint invention flows from
collaborative efforts.65  Indeed, irrespective of whether these aspects
are coexistent, collaboration is an absolute prerequisite to joint
inventorship, the specific issue of which the Federal Circuit addressed
in Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Distributing Co.
66
For persons to be joint inventors under Section 116, there
must be some element ofjoint behavior, such as collaboration
or working under common direction, one inventor seeing a
relevant report and building upon it or hearing another's
suggestion at a meeting.... Individuals cannot be joint
inventors if they are completely ignorant of what each other
has done until years after their individual independent efforts.
They cannot be totally independent of each other and be joint
inventors.
61d. at 1474, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1942. The Federal Circuit held that "the district
court applied the wrong legal standard in determining Dr. Ewen's contribution to the subject
matter claimed in the '851 patent, and that under the proper standard, there existed genuine
issue of material fact regarding inventorship" that made resolution by summary judgment
inappropriate. See ida t 1468,43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1937.
See id. at 1474, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1942. The Federal Circuit further noted that
the de novo standard of review should apply to the district court's rulings regarding conception
and inventorship, which are questions of law that rest on underlying facts. See id. at 1473 n.5,
43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941 n.5.65See Fina Oil & Chem. Co., 123 F.3d at 1473, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941 (stating "a
joint invention is simply the product of a collaboration between two or more persons working
together to solve the problem addressed"); Monsanto Co. v. Kamp, 269 F. Supp. 818, 824, 154
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 259, 262 (D.D.C. 1967) ("A joint invention is the product of collaboration of
the inventive endeavors of two or more persons working toward the same end and producing an
invention by their aggregate efforts").
6Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Proctor & Gamble Distrib. Co., 973 F.2d 911, 23 U.S.P.Q,2d
(DNA) 1921 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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SCIENTIFIC COLLABOR4TION
We therefore hold that joint inventorship under Section 116
requires at least some quantum of collaboration or
connection. 7
The Federal Circuit in Hess v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems,
Inc.68 refined the joint inventorship inquiry in the context of a patent
infringement suit involving a medical device known as a balloon
angioplasty catheter. 9 In holding that providing information regarding
the state of the art does not constitute an inventive contribution,70 the
Federal Circuit expressly recognized a distinction between co-invention
and certain aspects of collaboration.7
1
The patent-in-suit listed Drs. John B. Simpson and Edward W.
Robert as the inventors.72 Drs. Simpson and Robert began developing
the patented catheter while completing postdoctoral Cardiology
Fellowships at Stanford University Medical Center, after observing
balloon angioplasty at a medical conference.73 Following initial
unsuccessful experimentation vith different materials to construct the
balloon, the physicians contacted Robert L. Hess, an engineer at
671d at 917, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1926. In Kmborly.Clarl, the Federal Circuit
addressed the issue of joint inventorship in the context of a priority contest between fimbtrly-
Clark and Proctor & Gamble. See id at 913, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1922. The technology in
dispute involved the use of stand-up elasticized flaps inboard of the elasticized leg openings of
disposable baby diapers to control leakage of the baby's bowel movements, which could be
"explosive' and "runny" with breast-fed babies. See id. at 912, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1922.
The patent at issue in this lawsuit was U.S. Patent No. 4,695,278. See id. at 913, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1922.
63See Hess v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 106 F.3d 976, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1782 (Fed. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1277 (1997).6 91a at 976,41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1782.
7aSee id, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1787.
71See id., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1782 (noting that "a[n] inventory may use the
services, ideas, and aid of others in the process of perfecting his invention without losing his
right to a patent').
72See ia at 977, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1783 (identifying U.S. Patent No. 4,323,071,
which claimed a balloon angioplasty catheter, the balloon of which may be inflated after
insertion of the catheter into a patient's partially blocked artery to eliminate or reduce the
blockage, or stenosis).
73See Hess, 106 F.3d at 977, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1783 (stating that Dr. Simpson
visited Europe to observe balloon angioplasty techniques pioneered by a Swiss physician, who
had presented at the medical conference).
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Raychem Corporation, one of the largest manufacturers of heat
shrinkable materials.
74
Once Drs. Simpson and Robert described their device design and
reported the difficulties they encountered, Mr. Hess proposed the use of
heat shrinkable irradiated modified polyolefin tubing to construct the
balloon.75 Mr. Hess also suggested the benefit of attaching the balloon
to the catheter without the use of any potentially toxic adhesive
chemicals. 76  Following substantial additional experimentation, the
physicians achieved the claimed device, in which the balloon attached
to the catheter through an adhesive-free seal.77
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's determination that
Mr. Hess' contributions to the inventions did not constitute the
conception necessary to establish joint inventorship.78 The Federal
Circuit noted that Mr. Hess had provided Drs. Simpson and Robert
only with information that was "well known and found in textbooks. ' 79
Indeed, Mr. Hess did not participate in the day-to-day experimentation
with the prototypes, nor did he suggest the technique used to arrive at
74See id, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1783 (reporting that a Stanford colleague of Drs.
Simpson and Robert referred them to Mr. Hess, who was then a technical liaison between the
domestic and foreign operations at Raychem).
75See id, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1783 (noting that Mr. Hess also demonstrated "how
such a material could be used to form a balloon by heating the tubing above its crystalline
melting point, applying pressure, and then cooling the material").76See id, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1783 (describing the suggestion by Mr. Hess to use
"an adhesive free seal to attach the balloon to the catheter").
77See id at 977-78, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1783-84 (indicating that Drs. Simpson and
Robert spent four or five hours virtually every day attempting to use Raychem tubing supplied
by Mr. Hess to shrink fit the balloon to the catheter shaft without using adhesives).
7
'See Hess, 106 F.3d at 980-81, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1786 (affirming the district
court's conclusion despite the fact that "the doctors followed and utilized some of Mr. Hess's
suggestions in their extensive further research, testing and construction of their catheter").
79See id. at 977, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1783 (reciting the admissions by Mr. Hess that
"'the basic principles which I taught them'-involving heating the tubing 'above its crystalline
melting point, expanding it while your [sic] maintaining the pressure'-were 'in various
published textbooks and the like' and 'was a generally known process to a number of
companies."'); cf Pannu v. Iolab Corp., 155 F.3d 1344, 1351, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1657,
1663 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("During the meeting with Link, Pannu was doing more than simply
providing Link with well-known principles or explaining the state of the art; he was
contributing his ideas concerning the snag-resistant elements to a total inventive concept.
Because it is undisputed that the invention was conceived while Link and Pannu were engaged
in a collaborative enterprise and it is further undisputed that Pannu conceived significant
aspects of the invention, Pannu is certainly at least a co-inventor").
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the final successful balloon design.80 Therefore, the appellate court
held that the district court was justified in its conclusion.81
Still another approach to designating inventorship arose in
Ethicon, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp.82 In Ethicon, the
inventorship dispute arose in a patent infingement suit involving an
endoscopic surgical tool known as a trocar.83 The patent-in-suit listed
InBae Yoon as the sole inventor of a new safety trocar. 4  As the
exclusive licensee of this patent, Ethicon sued U.S. Surgical for
infingement.
85
Four years into the litigation, U.S. Surgical became aware of
Young Jae Choi, an electronics technician who had worked with Dr.
Yoon on several projects, including the development of the patented
safety trocar 8 6 U.S. Surgical agreed to pay Mr. Choi to assist in its
defense against the Ethicon lawsuit, and for Mr. Choi's grant of a
retroactive license to practice any safety trocar technology he
invented.87
goSee id at 978, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1784 (mentioning the technique of "free-
blowing," which Drs. Simpson and Robert use to develop the patented balloon catheter).
8
'See id at 979-80, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1785-86 (reiterating that the burden of proof
on the issue of misjoinder or nonjoinder of inventors is clear and convincing evidence, a heavy
burden, and that the district court was not clearly erroneous in concluding that Mr. Hess did not
establish joint inventorship).
82See Ethicon, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
83See id at 1459, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1546-47 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (describing a
trocar in further detail as an instrument comprised of an outer sleeve surrounding a shaft, one
end of which has a sharp blade), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 278 (1998). A surgeon can use the
blade to make a small incision in the wall of a body cavity, such as the abdomen, and insert the
trocar. See id, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547. The trocar shaft can be retracted to leave the
hollow outer sleeve, through which the surgeon can insert tiny cameras and other surgical tools
for the operation. Id, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547.
84See id, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547 (identifying U.S. Patent No. 4,535,773, which
claimed a safety trocar designed to prevent injury to an internal organ upon the puncture of the
body cavity the trocar blade).
"'See id, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547 (reporting the filing of suit in 1989 by Ethicon
against U.S. Surgical for infringement of claims 34 and 50 of the '773 patent).
86See id, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547 (stating that Mr. Choi, "who had some college
training in physics, chemistry, and electrical engineering, but no college degree," was not paid
during his 18 months of work with Dr. Yoon, and that Dr. Yoon did not infonn Mr. Choi of the
patent aplication or issuance or the designation of Dr. Yoon as the sole inventor).
"See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1546-47, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547 (indicating that in
exchange, U.S. Surgical agreed to pay Mr. Choi contingent on its ability to continue to practice
and market the invention).
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U.S. Surgical moved to correct the inventorship of the patent-in-
suit to include Mr. Choi as a co-inventor.8 8 The district court granted
this motion after an extensive hearing.89 U.S. Surgical next moved to
dismiss the patent infringement suit given its retroactive license.90 The
district court also granted this motion and dismissed the suit.
91
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that Mr.
Choi was a co-inventor of certain claims of the patent-in-suit based
upon a "rule of reason" analysis in which the record contained
sufficient corroborating evidence of joint inventorship.92 Furthermore,
the Federal Circuit upheld the dismissal of the lawsuit because Ethicon
failed to join Mr. Choi as a co-owner of the patent.93
In dissent, Judge Pauline Newman challenged the propriety of
construing 35 U.S.C. § 116 to vest a co-inventor of certain claims of a
patent with joint ownership, which amounts to "an undivided interest in
the entire patent" carrying "an unencumbered and unfettered right to
alienate an interest in the entire patent. 94 In particular, she noted with
respect to the 1984 amendment to 35 U.S.C. § 116 that:
This amendment did not also deal with the laws of patent
ownership, and did not automatically convey ownership of
88See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547 (specifying the motion by U.S. Surgical to
correct inventorship under 35 U.S.C. § 256, claiming that Mr. Choi was a co-inventor of claims
23, 33, 46 and 47 of the '773 patent).
89See ie, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547 (reporting the district court's finding that Mr.
Choi had provided an inventive contribution to the subject matter of claims 33 and 47).
9°See id. at 1459-60, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547 (contending that as a joint owner of
the patent, Mr. Choi granted U.S. Surgical a valid license under the patent).
91See &Le at 1460, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547 (providing the basis for the appeal by
Ethicon to the Federal Circuit).
92See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1464, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1551 ("Under the 'rule of
reason' standard for corroborating evidence, the trial court must consider corroborating
evidence in context, make necessary credibility determinations, and assign appropriate
probative weight to the evidence to determine whether clear and convincing evidence supports
a claim of co-inventorship." (internal citation omitted)).
93See id. at 1467-68, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1554 ("[A]s a matter of substantive patent
law, all co-owners must ordinarily consent to join as plaintiffs in an infringement suit,
Consequently, 'one co-owner has the right to impede the other co-owner's ability to sue
infringers by refusing to voluntarily join in such a suit."' (citation omitted)).
94See id. at 1468, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1555 (Newman, J., dissenting) ("C[V]hether or
not Mr. Choi made an inventive contribution to two of the fifty-five claims of the '773 patent,
he is not a joint owner of the other fifty-three claims of the patent. Neither the law of joint
invention nor the law of property so requires, and indeed these laws mandate otherwise").
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the entire patent to everyone who could now be named as an
inventor, whatever the contribution. The amendment simply
permitted persons to be named on the patent document,
whether as minor contributors to a subordinate embodiment,
or full partners in the creation and development of the
invention. The ownership relationships among the persons
who, under § 116, could now be recognized as contributors to
the invention, is irrelevant to the purpose of the amendment
of § 116, and to its consequences. Section 116 has nothing to
do with patent ownership. s
ANALYSIS AND IMPACT
The pronouncements of the Federal Circuit in Fina and Kimberly-Clark
concerning the severe potential legal consequences (i.e., vesting of
ownership through inventorship) of collaboration arguably fuel
anxieties over the exchange of information between researchers. With
the nature of any collaborative exchange being a relevant factor to
consider, no degree of temporal interaction seems immune from
constituting an inventive contribution.96  Accordingly, from the
institutional perspective focusing on the ownership of patent rights,
prudence might demand the imposition of outright restrictions on
extramural collaboration by its researchers in the absence of express
allocations of the prospective exclusive rights.97 The implementation
95See it at 1470, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1556 (Newman, J., dissenting); se also id at
1471, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1557 (Newman, J., dissenting) ("After the major change that the
1984 amendment to Section 116 made in 'joint invention,' by authorizing the naming of any
contributor to any claim of a patent, the legal premise that each named person had made a full
and equal contribution to the entire patented invention became obsolete. It is not an
implementation of the common law of property, or its statutory embodiment- to treat all
persons, however minor their contribution, as full owners of the entire property as a matter of
law. The law had never given a contributor to a minor portion of an invention a full share in
the originator's patent. By amending Section 116 in order to remove an antiquated pitfall
whereby patents were being unjustly invalidated, the legislators surely did not intend to create
another inequity. Apparently no one foresaw that judges might routinely transfer pre-1934
ownership concepts into the changed inventorship law." (internal citations omitted)).96lndeed, the Federal Circuit apparently has not had occasion to carve out an express dc
minimis exception, applicable, for example, where a brief exchange batween collabomors
contributes to the conception of the invention.
97See Bartow, supra note 44, at 682-94 (discussing various reasons that "maximizaion
of institutional profits may require suppression of inventions").
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of such policies, however, would seem to chill the enjoyment of any
"academic freedom" by those involved in research and development
teams, commercial or otherwise.
Likewise, although Judge Newman did not elaborate, beyond the
arguably unjust outcome in Ethicon, on the likely ramifications of the
Federal Circuit's interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 116 to accord co-
ownership rights in the entire patent based upon joint inventorship of
one or more of the patent claims, her alarm finds concurrence among at
least some practitioners.98 In particular, the potential impact of the
statutory scheme she criticizes can manifest a chilling effect on
collegiality and collaboration among those in the research and
development community. 99 By dramatically escalating the potential
harm from unforeseen joint inventorship scenarios, the legislature and
judiciary might have unwittingly fostered an environment of caution
and mistrust, which impinges on the intellectual freedom that drives
innovation.100
98See Dale L. Carson & James R. Barney, The Division of Rights Among Joint Inventors:
Public Policy Concerns After Ethicon v. U.S. Surgical, 39 IDEA 251, 259 (1999) ("[T]he
Ethicon rule imposes a particular disadvantage upon small, individual inventors who may not
have access to patent counsel during the inventive process when the critical decision whether or
not to collaborate with others must necessarily be made"); Tigran Guledjian, Comment,
Teaching the Federal Circuit New Tricks: Updating the Law of Joint Inventorship in Patents,
32 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1273, 1298 (1999) (presenting various options for distributing patent
rights among inventors, including those inventors whose contributions might be ancillary and
minor).
"Even as we approach breakthroughs of unprecedented proportions concerning our very
essence as humans, intellectual property issues lurk in the shadows. See, e.g., Nicholas Wade,
Rivals talk of pooling work to decipher human genome, OREONIAM, Nov. 14, 1999, at A6
("Talk of collaboration has flared among rivals pursuing one of biology's highest goals:
decoding the human genome.... Although many of the participants agree in principle that a
pooling of efforts would get the job done sooner, their desire to collaborate is tempered by rival
agendas, especially on the question of access to the DNA data, and personal disagreements").
1°°For a scholarly discussion of analogous policy considerations informing the
application of the on sale bar under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), see Janice M. Mueller, Conception,
Testing, Reduction to Practice: When is it Really on Sale?, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEBARK OFF.
Soc'' 305, 308 (1998) ("A related policy concern, infrequently articulated in the Federal
Circuit's on sale jurisprudence, recognizes the importance of unrestricted communication and
collaboration between inventors and potential customers for their inventions. If users of the
patent system come to understand that pre-critical date communications concerning an
invention that is not yet developed can trigger the bar, future communications of like nature
will be chilled"). See also Imron T. Aly, Note, Seller Beware: The Scope of the On Sale Bar
After Pfaff v. Wells, 7 TEx. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 403, 424 (1999) (citing Mueller, supra).
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Yet, the holding in Hess distinguishing information about the
existing state of the art from an inventive contribution greatly alleviates
any concern that impromptu exchanges among researchers might create
joint inventorship issues. ° l To the extent that the joint conception of
inventions likely stems instead from directed (intentional) collaborative
efforts as a practical matter, research and development institutions can
rest better assured that adequate contractual provisions for parsing out
ownership of prospective patent rights in such joint ventures can be
implemented in advance.'J
If nothing else, anecdotal support exists for the awareness of joint
inventorship concerns as a likely spirited battleground for patent
litigation in the start of this new millennium. " Whereas the
investigation to uncover previously undisclosed prior art as the basis
for an invalidity or unenforceability defense might have been the
traditional strategic focus for the alleged infringer in a patent suit, the
search for unnamed inventors in the midst of any collaborative efforts
to achieve the patented technology is on the rise.104 Indeed, a natural
starting point for such a search is the authorship and acknowledgement
listing set forth on academic or trade publications and presentations
"0Indeed, apparently once established that the contribution of a collaborator constitutes
knowledge available in the prior art, the recognizable value of the contribution to the actual
research effort becomes meaningless. See Brown v. University of California, 866 F. Supp. 439,
445, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1463, 1468 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that despite her "substantial
role" in the discovery of feline leukemia virus, the plaintiff was "a nonscientist who played no
role in the laboratory work involved in isolating the virus; therefore, regardless of the value of
her research leads, she cannot be deemed to have contributed to the conception of the
inventions covered by the patents").
1"2With a reliable delineation of patent rights in this regard, the collegiality of
institutional researchers arguably becomes indistinguishable from any other managed resource
of the institution. See Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and
Folk Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MiNN. L. REv. 129, 130-31 (1998) (eWith
property, each individual harvests the rewards of her care and effort in the management of her
resources, just as she suffers the losses from her sloth and poor management; thoze features of
property make her more likely to exereise diligence and prudence about the things she onvs).
103See, e.g., Brenda Sandburg, Witness Flip-Flop Spikes Patent Suit, IP MAG., Dee. 29,
1998 ("Inventor J. Timothy Rainey made American Dental Technologies, Inc. an offer it
couldn't-and it didn't-refuse. For a deal valued by defense lawyers at more than S509,000,
Rainey switched sides in a patent dispute by changing his testimony and dropping his claim
that he had invented three dental procedures ADT said it had patented").
1
°4See Carson, supra note 97, at 266 ("Mhe Ethicon decision will spur defendants in
patent litigations to search in earnest for latent co-inventors who can absolve the defendants of
their sins-past, present and future").
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related to the patented technology.10 5  If this information does not
comport with inventorship designations, a colorable basis arguably
would exist for an invalidity challenge or an evolving defense created
by an Ethicon-type licensing arrangement.1
0 6
Unfortunately, this patent enforcement dynamic might force
institutions, and thus their researchers, to disfavor broad attribution
even in otherwise scholarly publications and presentations. To the
extent that such attention is an integral part of the social fabric of the
scientific community, collegiality and collaboration will likely suffer to
the detriment of innovation.
CONCLUSION
Scientific progress depends upon the ability of individual researchers to
engage in the exchange of information free from proprietary concerns.
In some cases, such interaction might result in a mere horizontal
transmission of knowledge already otherwise in the public domain,
which can facilitate inventive acts nevertheless. In others, the
correspondence might give rise to joint invention, or serve as a
foundation for future cooperative efforts in that regard. The policy
goals of the U.S. patent system would seem contravened if the laws
deterred collaborative exchanges in any of these scenarios.
105But see In re Katz, 687 F.2d 450, 455, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 14, 18 (C.C.P.A. 1982)
("As an initial matter, we hold that authorship of an article by itself does not raise a
presumption of inventorship with respect to the subject matter disclosed in the article. Thus,
co-authors may not be presumed to be coinventors merely from the fact of co-authorship. On
the other hand, when the PTO is aware of a printed publication, which describes the subject
matter of the claimed invention and is published before an application is filed (the only date of
invention on which it must act in the absence of other proof), the article may or may not raise a
substantial question whether the applicant is the inventor. For example, if the author (whether
he is the applicant or not) specifically states that he is describing the work of the applicant, no
question at all is raised. The content and nature of the printed publication, as well as the
circumstances surrounding its publication, not merely its authorship, must be considered"); see
also Canon Computer Sys., Inc. v. Nu-Kote Int'l, Inc., 134 F.3d 1085, 1088, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1355, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("Improper inventorship is not presumed simply because a
large number of individuals are listed on the patent as joint inventors").
1'6See supra notes 87-94 & accompanying text (discussing in detail the litigation strategy
in Ethicon of obtaining a retroactive license from an unnamed inventor in conjunction with
seeking to correct the inventorship designation of the patent-in-suit).
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At present, the interface between inventorship and oMership
under the patent law introduces a regrettable caution into the scientific
community over attribution, which has silently served as a social
currency for the exchange of ideas. Where the statutory framework
begins to exacerbate the tension between commercial considerations
and the open sharing of information, the patent law would appear
paradoxically to have us careen backward-to a climate in which
innovation is enshrouded in the darkness of secrecy and isolationism,
rather than allowed to flourish in the light of collegiality and
collaboration.
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